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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the political and security impacts of the devolution of power 
to Russia’s regions since 1993.  By reviewing the basis of Russia’s federal structure the 
author identifies how the nature of the structure and the manner in which it evolved have 
led to the emergence of local tsars who have few horizontal or vertical checks on their 
power.  The thesis analyzes the impact that strong regional leaders have had within their 
regions, to include their impact on free and fair elections, free press, individuals’ rights, 
and rule of law.  The author finds that the lack of checks on the regional leaders’ abuses 
of power within the regions destabilizes the country by only further encouraging them to 
expand their power into realms intended to be under the control of the federal 
government, to include the military and foreign policy.  The resultant injection of 
regional leadership into these matters threatens the security of Russia by inhibiting the 
ability of the central government to field a cohesive military force and pursue cogent 
foreign policy.  The thesis further examines the prospects for regional tsars in light of 
recent efforts to rein in the regions.  The author determines that these reforms, though 
resulting in a degree of centralization, also target some of the key problems in Russia’s 
federation, to include the dearth of checks on regional power and the contradictions in the 
legal framework guiding center-periphery relations.  However, further reforms targeting 
Russia’s antiquated federal structure and enforcement mechanisms are recommended. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................2 
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT ..................................................2 
II. EVOLUTION OF CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS .....................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....................................................................5 
C. FEDERATION TREATY ...............................................................................9 
D. 1993 CONSTITUTION .................................................................................10 
E. BILATERAL TREATIES.............................................................................12 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................14 
III. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONALISM:  THE RISE OF 
REGIONAL TSARS?................................................................................................15 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 
B. FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY .........................................................15 
C. BENEFITS OF REGIONALISM TO DEMOCRACY ..............................17 
D. DANGERS OF REGIONALISM FOR DEMOCRACY............................18 
1. Elections ..............................................................................................18 
2. Media...................................................................................................22 
3. Human Rights Abuses .......................................................................24 
4. Rule of Law.........................................................................................25 
5. Gubernatorial Elections ....................................................................26 
6. Vertical Checks on Abuses................................................................27 
7. Horizontal Checks on Abuses ...........................................................29 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................31 
IV. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONALISM:  THE MILITARY 
AND FOREIGN POLICY.........................................................................................33 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................33 
B. REGIONALISM’S INFLUENCE ON THE MILITARY..........................33 
1. Background ........................................................................................33 
2. Military/Regional Cooperation.........................................................34 
3. Self-centered Regions.........................................................................35 
4. Possibilities of Regional Control over the Military.........................37 
5. Possibilities of Regional Control over Nuclear Weapons...............39 
6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................41 
C. REGIONALISM’S INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY.....................41 
1. Background ........................................................................................41 
2. Legal Framework...............................................................................42 
3. Benefits of the Regions’ Involvement in Foreign Policy.................43 
4. Dangers of the Regions’ Involvement in Foreign Policy ................45 
 viii
5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................48 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................51 
A.   INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51 
B.   NECESSARY REFORMS ............................................................................51 
C. RESTRUCTURING THE FEDERATION .................................................57 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................59 
APPENDIX.  RUSSIA’S ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS.............................................61 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................63 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, power has devolved to Russia’s 
regions.  Although the overcentralized nature of the Soviet Union necessitated such a 
transfer, the increased power of the regions has not been entirely positive.  Due to the 
perpetuation of an asymmetrical federal structure and the evolution of a contradictory and 
vague legal framework to guide center-periphery relations, many regional leaders gained 
a tremendous amount of power.  Lacking both horizontal and vertical checks on their 
power, many regional leaders became virtual tsars within their regions.  While these 
leaders typically maintain a façade of democracy in order to appease the central 
government, they freely violate democratic norms in their attempts to remain in power.  
As a result, such things as free and fair elections, free press, individuals’ rights, and rule 
of law have suffered tremendously.  The ability of the regional leaders to exert control 
over their regions is furthered by their influence over the regional legislative and judicial 
branches, and by the ineffectiveness of federal representatives.   
The freedom provided to the regional leaders within their regions only encourages 
them to extend their influence into a variety of realms intended to be under the control of 
the federal government, to include the military and foreign policy.  In some cases, the 
regions’ actions in these areas actually benefit Russia; however, the federal government’s 
toleration of such interference in areas of federal jurisdiction sets a bad precedent, as the 
regions’ actions frequently undermine the policies of the federal government.  The 
inability of Russia to regulate the regions’ influence in these spheres also presents 
significant dilemmas for any countries that interact with Russia, to include the United 
States, as they must determine to what extent the regions should be incorporated into 
diplomatic activities.  Although the regions’ influence on the military and foreign policy 
has not yet been more than a mild irritant, the regions hold the potential to significantly 
undermine both the security and stability of the country.   
President Vladimir Putin recently initiated reforms aimed at restricting the power 
of the regional leaders.  While these reforms have elicited criticism for the centralization 
that they will no doubt induce, they do target some of the key problems in the balance of 
 x
power between the central and regional governments, to include the contradictory legal 
framework and the dearth of checks on regional power.  However, further reforms are 
needed, to include the difficult task of restructuring Russia’s constituent units along more 
rational lines.  Russia faces tremendous obstacles in creating a stable federation.  
However, any reticence in dealing with the growing power of the regions will only lead 
to the further strengthening of regional tsars, resulting in increased threats to the security 
and stability of the country. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia faced tremendous 
challenges in reforming the structure of both its political and economic systems.  
Overcentralization had plagued the USSR for many years, but decentralization was a 
contentious issue which would necessitate a larger role for the regions.  The Soviet 
Union, a federation only in name, was actually a unitary state with the constituent Soviet 
Socialist Republics having no real power.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided 
the opportunity for a new quest for power by the constituent units of the Russian 
Federation.  With the economic and political chaos that engulfed Russia in its early years, 
no legal framework existed to codify the relations between the regional governments and 
the central government.  The legal framework for federal relations in Russia began to 
emerge only after regions had to a great extent already defined their own spheres of 
power.  As a result, attempts to codify center-periphery relations continue to face an 
uphill battle, with the central government attempting to limit or reduce the preexisting 
power of the regions.  Since 1992, numerous haphazard attempts have been made to 
delineate the regional and central spheres of power, to include the 1992 Federation 
Treaty, the 1993 Constitution, and numerous bilateral treaties in the years that followed.  
Despite these efforts to provide clear powers to both levels of government, the legal 
framework remains contradictory and vague.  As a result of both the lack of federal 
structure early on, and its obfuscated nature at present, regional leaders have been 
provided with tremendous leeway.  The ambiguity of the legal framework outlining 
federal relations in Russia is only exacerbated by the inability of the central government 
to enforce its laws.   
The latitude provided to the regional leaders has significantly impacted both the 
separate regions and the country as a whole.  Of particular concern within the regions is 
the extent to which local leaders have chosen to either inhibit or promote 
democratization.  With little oversight from the central government, some regional 
leaders have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to become tsars within their 
2 
region.  They have extended their realms of power to such an extent that many exert 
control over the press, fix local elections, promote laws contradicting those of the federal 
government and the Russian Constitution, and severely impinge on the human rights of 
those residing in their region, among other things.  As regional tsars have sought to 
extend their power, they have in some cases intervened in areas traditionally controlled 
by the central government, such as the military and foreign policy.  While at times the 
injection of regional leadership into these areas may benefit the central government, this 
added dimension does not come without risks.     
B. IMPORTANCE 
In the early 1990s, many analysts expressed concerns that Russia would go the 
way of the Soviet Union, and disintegrate along national and/or regional lines.  For a 
variety of reasons, this has not, and likely will not occur.  This does not, however, mean 
that federal relations within Russia are solidified and closed to alteration.  While 
federalism and its accompanying regionalization have in many ways benefited Russia, 
they have also created many problems, and have emerged as a source of instability.  The 
nature of future center-periphery relations remains ambiguous.  Until both central and 
regional powers are clearly delineated, there will always be room for either the central or 
regional leaders to attempt to manipulate relations to their advantage.  These power 
struggles are only exacerbated by Russia’s antiquated federal structure, which poorly 
suits the country today.  Characteristic of the current flexibility in relations are the recent 
attempts by President Putin to reexert control over the regions.  With power continuing to 
fluctuate between the center and the regions, and regional leaders attempting to expand 
their spheres of power, the future stability and security of Russia remain in question. 
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
In order to arrive at a prediction regarding the future potential for a strong and 
stable federation to emerge in Russia, this thesis will first examine the foundations of the 
current federal relations and establish the source and evolution of regional power.  
Because the basic foundations for federalism were established in 1993, the determination 
of the implications of regionalism will focus on the period from 1993 to present.  
Intertwined with the political and security dimensions of the regions’ ascendancy are a 
multitude of other issues, to include such things as taxation, trade, crime, and ethnicity.  
3 
All of these issues, as they affect the center-periphery relationship, are extremely 
complex issues.  Unfortunately, due to the need to constrain the topic, they will not be 
dealt with in detail.  Instead, they will be addressed only when necessary in order to 
clarify the discussion.   
Once the basis of federalism in Russia is established, this thesis will examine the 
effects of the current structure of the Russian state on issues both internal and external to 
the regions.  An examination of the implications of regionalism within the regions 
themselves will focus on determining the extent to which the regional leaders have 
become tsars within their regions by evaluating the extent to which rule of law exits, 
whether local elections are free and fair, whether individuals’ rights are respected, and 
the extent to which the press is free.  While these variables will certainly vary 
significantly across the regions, this examination will seek to uncover general trends in 
behavior across the regions.  Additionally, examples of particularly blatant violations of 
democratic norms by specific leaders will be provided as a demonstration of the 
instability local leaders are capable of producing.  
The emergence of regional leaders who feel unconstrained in their behavior has 
encouraged the expansion of regional influence into a variety of realms that are intended 
to be under the control of the federal government, thus affecting Moscow’s ability to 
establish coherent national policy.  Although the regions’ influence on the central 
government extends into many realms, perhaps most threatening to security and stability 
of Russia is their influence on the military and foreign policy.  As such, this thesis will 
examine the extent to which the regions have been able to carry their influence over into 
these realms, and propose both its benefits and risks, actual and potential.  
The final question to be dealt with in this thesis is the future of regional tsars in 
Russia.  Putin’s recent efforts to reestablish control over the regions will be examined and 
evaluated in regards to their ability to reverse the emerging trend of authoritarianism in 
the regions.  Additionally, recommendations will be made regarding ways in which 
Russia might strengthen its federal structure in the future in order to further restrain the 
actions of regional leaders.  Should Russia fail to rein in the regional tsars, the country’s 
future as a stable and secure federal state could be undermined.  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
5 
II. EVOLUTION OF CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 
 A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the complicated implications of regionalism today, it is 
first necessary to determine how the relationship between the central and regional 
governments has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the obstacles that have 
impeded attempts to codify relations, and the nature of the legal framework that guides 
today’s center-periphery relations.  The devolution of power from Russia’s central 
government to its regional governments did not occur in a linear manner; instead, power 
has vacillated between the two levels of government.  This fluctuation has primarily 
resulted from the lack of a clear legal delineation of power between the regional and 
federal governments.  Instead of one clear body of law regulating the relationship 
between the center and the periphery, various legal frameworks have evolved over time, 
which contain numerous contradictions and ambiguities.  The reasons Russia has faced 
such difficulties in developing a true federation are varied, and include such things as the 
historical legacy of Soviet pseudo-federalism, problems induced by the inequality in the 
status of various regions, conflicting views on regional versus federal jurisdiction, the 
allocation of regions’ resources, and conflicting views of federalism itself. 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Had the Russian government been able to develop a federal structure from 
scratch, they no doubt would have been much more successful.  Instead, by carrying over 
much of the Soviet structure to the Russian state, problems abounded from the beginning.  
During Soviet times, the Russian Federation, then the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR), was one of fifteen Union Republics which comprised the Soviet 
Union.  Officially the Soviet Union was described as a federation, with the Union 
Republics supposedly possessing the right to secession.  However, despite the 
development of “an elaborate constitutional façade that granted varying degrees of self-
determination and autonomy to the bewildering array of Eurasian peoples that were 
conquered and assimilated into the Russian empire over centuries,” in reality, the Soviet 
6 
Union was a unitary state “run strictly from Moscow.”1  Within the RSFSR were three 
levels of administrative units:  autonomous republics, which were comprised of 
significant national minorities, territorially based regions (oblasts and krais), where 
Russians predominated, and autonomous regions (oblasts) and districts (okrugs), where 
smaller ethnic groups resided (see Appendix).2  The autonomous republics were created 
with the intention of providing some of Russia’s larger ethnic minorities with their own 
national homeland.  Despite this intention, the majority population of many of the 
republics was, and continues to be, Russian.  Indeed, in only four of the twenty-one 
republics of the Russian Federation do the titular nationally actually represent a majority 
of the population.3  During Soviet times, the ethnic republics received privileges which 
the territorially based regions did not, to include being “endowed with the trappings of 
statehood.”4  Due to the weak ethnic foundations of many of the republics, the territorial 
regions resented the special privileges that were awarded to the republics.  However, 
these additional rights did not provide the ethnic republics with the same benefits as the 
Union Republics, which were also based on ethnicity.  The ethnic republics of the RSFSR 
“were not officially sovereign and did not have even the nominal right of secession that 
the Union republics enjoyed….[and] enjoyed far fewer cultural amenities than the titular 
nationalities of the Union republics.”5  The differentiation between both the ethnic 
republics and Union Republics in the Soviet Union, and between the ethnic republics and 
territorial divisions within the RSFSR existed as sources of tension even prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.     
In 1990, several events transpired which initiated the emergence of Russia’s 
regions as players in the political arena.  The first of these was the growing realization 
that the days of regional elites answering only to central officials were quickly drawing to 
                                                 
1 Fred Weir, “Putin Moves to Govern Governors,” The Christian Science Monitor (18 May 2000); 
internet; available from http://www.csmonitor/durable/2000/05/18/p6s1.htm; accessed 18 August 2001. 
2 Martin Nicholson, Towards a Russia of the Regions (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 12. 
3 These republics are:  Chechnya, Chuvashia, North Ossetia, and Tuva; in Nicholson, Towards a 
Russia of the Regions, 16. 
4 Elizabeth Teague, “Center-Periphery Relations In Russia,” National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia 
and the New States of Euroasia, (Armonk, N.Y.:  M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 26. 
5 Ann Sheehy, “Russia’s Republics:  A Threat to Its Territorial Integrity?” RFE/RL Research Report 3, 
no. 20 (May 1993), 36. 
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a close.  The initiation of local legislative elections across the Soviet Union in 1990 “rang 
the death knell to the days of unchallenged democratic centralism as regional politicians 
became aware that soon they might be more accountable to their local constituents than to 
their bosses in Moscow.”6  The advent of local accountability encouraged regional elites 
to find ways to enhance their power. 
While the creation of local legislatures through popular elections led to regionalist 
tendencies in both Russia’s territorial regions and republics, the republics led the way in 
challenging the central government for power.  Provoking declarations of sovereignty by 
Russia’s autonomous republics was a law passed by the Soviet parliament in April 1990 
that equalized the status of the autonomous republics with that of the Union Republics.  
Although the law was intended to reduce the status of the Union Republics, it instead, by 
seeming to raise the status of the autonomous republics, provoked them to follow the lead 
of the Union Republics and issue their own declarations of sovereignty.7  The Russian 
leadership resented Gorbachev’s apparent efforts to raise the status of the autonomous 
republics, which they saw “as threatening the territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation, particularly as not all the Russian republics were willing to offer their support 
to Yeltsin.”8 
In an attempt to counter Gorbachev’s actions “to fragment his rival’s power-base 
in Russia,”9 Yeltsin sought to win over the leadership of the autonomous republics.  After 
having been elected chairman of the Russian parliament in August of 1990, Yeltsin told 
audiences in Russia’s republics that “he would not make Gorbachev’s mistake of 
resisting demands from the republics for more rights…[and] reiterated the view…that 
power structures should be formed from the bottom up.”10  He then went on to tell the 
leaders of the autonomous republics to “‘take as much autonomy as you can swallow.’”11  
                                                 
6 Jeff Kahn, “The Parade of Sovereignties:  Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian 
Federalism,” Post-Soviet Affairs 16, no. 1 (2000), 61. 
7 Teague, 29. 
8 Sheehy, 37. 
9 Nicholson, Towards a Russia of the Regions 14. 
10 Sheehy, 37. 
11 Teague, 30. 
8 
This statement only further encouraged the autonomous republics to move ahead with 
their declarations of sovereignty. 
While Yeltsin’s deference to the republics aided him in the short term, it created 
problems following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 as the republics sought to 
increase their economic and political autonomy.  Fearful that Russia would go the way of 
the Soviet Union and be ripped apart by ethnic separatism, Yeltsin sought to appease the 
republics through a variety of concessions.12  Unfortunately, these actions only served to 
alienate the territorial regions.  In attempts to enhance their own status, some territorially 
based regions began declaring themselves to be republics.  Others simply went ahead and 
declared their sovereignty.  
As the drafting of a new Russian constitution began, the structure of federalism 
became a particularly contentious issue.  Up for discussion were such issues as whether 
sovereignty would reside with the center or the regions and whether the constituent units 
of the federation would be the existing ones, or new ones equal in status.13  Due to the 
complexity of these issues and the growing tensions between the central government and 
both the territorially and ethnically based regions, progress on developing a new 
constitution was exceedingly slow.  With the regions exerting increasingly separatist 
tendencies, fears abounded that Russia would disintegrate.   
In the absence of a constitution to regulate center-periphery relations, Yeltsin 
sought out ways to limit the powers of the regional governments.  In the fall of 1991, 
Yeltsin created two new positions in each region:  a presidentially-appointed head of 
administration, or governor, and a presidential representative.  Although the appointment 
of governors was intended to produce officials loyal to Moscow, many of the governors 
transferred their loyalties to their region, and led the efforts to gain increased 
independence from Moscow.14  The attempt to rein in the regions through presidential 
representatives proved to be no more successful than the appointment of governors.  The 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, “Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism,” The New 
Russia, 92. 
14 Josephine Andrews and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia,” 
Post-Soviet Affairs 11, no. 4 (1995), 387. 
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representatives, intended to be the “eyes and ears of the emperor,” were resented in the 
regions, and received little cooperation from local officials.15   
C. FEDERATION TREATY 
After the preceding attempts failed to control the regions, and lacking a 
constitution to provide a legal basis for center-periphery relations, Yeltsin sought to 
alleviate tensions with three federative treaties in 1992.  Although these treaties came to 
be know collectively as the Federation Treaty, in reality it was a series of three treaties:  
one between Moscow and representatives of eighteen of the twenty-one ethnic republics 
(Tatarstan and Chechnya abstained), one between Moscow and the Federation’s oblasts 
and krais, and one between Moscow and the autonomous okrugs and the Jewish 
Autonomous Oblast.16  The treaty was intended as a sort of holding operation to provide 
stability to center-periphery relations until an acceptable constitution could be adopted.   
The Federation Treaty perpetuated the tradition of asymmetrical federalism in 
Russia with the republics being considered autonomous states within a federation, while 
the territorially based regions were considered to be administrative units of a unitary 
state.17  Additionally, the republics were given control over the natural resources on their 
territory, which the territorial divisions lacked, and were given greater control over 
Moscow’s ability to declare a state of emergency within their territory.  The Federation 
Treaty did succeed in outlining the division of authority between Moscow and the 
republics and territorial regions; however, the particulars regarding the execution of 
responsibilities that were to be shared by both the center and the regions were not clearly 
specified resulting in the potential for future disagreements.18   
The Federation Treaty was further undermined by the refusal of Tatarstan and 
Chechnya to sign the treaty.  Chechnya’s refusal had little impact on the evolution of 
center-periphery relations in Russia, as it was largely “the product of Chechnya’s 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 386. 
16 Lapidus and Walker, 93. 
17 James Hughes, “Moscow’s Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion,” Transition 2, no. 19 (20 
September 1996), 39. 
18 Teague, 36. 
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historical experience and contemporary political turmoil.”19  It is significant to note at 
this point that Chechnya’s separatism was “the aberration…[because] Chechens have 
been bucking Moscow’s yoke for centuries; their fundamentalist orientation has attracted 
outside support; and their external border makes independence at least a possibility.”20  
Contrary to Chechnya’s refusal to sign the treaty, Tatarstan’s refusal was “a form of 
brinkmanship designed to secure an advantageous arrangement with the federal 
center…[which] set a benchmark for the aspirations of other republics and regions.”21     
Despite hopes that the Federation Treaty would stabilize center-periphery 
relations in Russia, it failed to restrain the regions in their efforts to widen their spheres 
of power.  This was particularly true of the territorially based regions, which resented the 
special privileges granted to the ethnic republics in the treaty.  Their pursuant actions 
included such things as “unilaterally adopt[ing] their own constitutions and upgrad[ing] 
their status to ‘republic within the Russian Federation.’”22   
D. 1993 CONSTITUTION 
The next benchmark in relations between the central and regional governments in 
Russia was the 1993 Constitution, which remains the central document for defining 
center-periphery relations.  The events leading up to the adoption of the Constitution, 
characterized by the conflict between Yeltsin and the parliament, will not be discussed 
here except to say that the conflict provided the regions with further means to expand 
their powers.  In efforts to gain the support of the regions in the crisis, both Yeltsin and 
the parliament appealed to the provincial leaders for support, thus demonstrating the 
extent to which power had devolved from the center to the regions.23   
In the Constitution that emerged, the status of the territorially based regions was 
upgraded, as all of the eighty-nine constituent units of the Russian Federation were 
assigned equal status.  As a result, the Constitution eliminated both the rights of the 
                                                 
19 Nicholson, Towards a Russia of the Regions, 16. 
20 Clifford Kupchan, “Devolution Drives Russian Reform,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2000):  
6 [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis. 
21 Nicholson, Towards a Russia of the Regions, 16. 
22 Hughes, 40. 
23 Teague, 46. 
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republics to call themselves sovereign and their right to secede from the federation.24  
Additionally, whereas the republics had previously possessed unilateral jurisdiction over 
their natural resources, the new Constitution relegated the issue to joint jurisdiction 
between the republics and the central government.   
However, some differentiation remained between the ethnically and territorially 
based regions, with only the republics able to adopt their own constitutions and state 
languages.  The territorially based regions were given permission only to adopt charters 
or statutes.25  Like the Federation Treaty, the Constitution outlined areas of regional, 
central, and joint control.  Unfortunately, the Constitution did no better than the treaty in 
explaining how joint jurisdiction was to be employed.  An additional flaw with the 
Constitution was its failure to elucidate the status of the Federation Treaty.  As a result, 
the regions continue to justify their actions based on whichever document provides them 
with the greatest advantage.  Overall, the Constitution “failed to clearly define 
substantive issues of power-sharing between the center and the federation subjects.”26  
Dissatisfaction with the Constitution became evident right away, because although 58.4 
percent of voters nationwide supported the Constitution, it was not ratified in forty-two of 
the eighty-nine regions.27  Thus, the majority of the subjects did not consent to 
membership in the federation, only serving to further weaken the foundations of center-
periphery relations in Russia.   
While it would typically be assumed that the acceptance of the Constitution would 
provide the final word on center-periphery relations in Russia it failed to do so, due to a 
provision allowing for “executive organs of the federal government, by mutual 
agreement, to delegate some of their powers to the regions and republics, and likewise 
executive organs of the regions and republics can delegate some of their powers to the 
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federal government.”28  This provision, combined with the allowance in the Constitution 
for federal relations to be regulated by the Constitution, the 1992 Federation Treaty, and 
other treaties, opened the way for the bilateral agreements between Moscow and the 
regions that emerged from 1994 to 1999. 
E. BILATERAL TREATIES 
The signing of the first bilateral treaty between Moscow and Tatarstan in 
February of 1994, marked a new stage in the development of federalism in Russia.  
Instead of the constitutional federalism that had prevailed since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia began to establish federal relations on a more contractual basis.29  The 
treaty with Tatarstan, while not intended to become a model for relations with other 
regions, clearly raised Tatarstan above the status of equals that was prescribed by the 
Constitution.  The treaty even went so far as to provide for Tatarstan to be regarded as a 
state joined with the Russian Federation.30   
With no region willing to be outdone in the grasp for more power, treaties were 
soon negotiated with a number of the ethnic republics, to include Bashkortostan, Sakha, 
Kabardino-Balkyria, North Ossetiya-Alaniya, Buryatiya, and Udmurtiya, in 1994 and 
1995.  This series of treaties only served to exacerbate Russia’s asymmetrical federalism.  
The treaties described the relationship between Russia and the constituent members in a 
variety of ways, and accorded a wide range of rights to regions.  Characteristically, 
contrary to the status of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan was described as “a sovereign state 
within the Russian Federation;” Kabardino-Balkyria was described as “a state with the 
Russian Federation;” and Udmurtiya was simply described as “a republic.”31  In addition 
to differentiating the status of the regions, the treaties also augmented the ambiguity of 
center-periphery relations, with the constitutions of the republics being assigned varying 
degrees of strength in relation to the federal Constitution.     
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In 1995, with the 1996 presidential election approaching, Yeltsin sought to 
broaden his base of support in the regions by extending the negotiation of bilateral 
treaties to the territorially based regions.  Thus, in the first six months of 1996, sixteen 
treaties were signed with the regions, and by mid-1999 forty-six of eighty-nine regions 
had negotiated a treaty with Moscow.32   
Critics of the bilateral treaty process argue that it has undermined the 
Constitution, and succeeded in making center-periphery relations even more ambiguous.  
Exemplifying this, many of the treaties contradict the Constitution and describe 
delineations of power contrary to those outlined as either federal, regional, or joint in the 
Constitution.  As a result, federalism “has developed into a mesh of overlapping 
jurisdictions and complex interactions between state and sub-state actors.”33  Although 
Yeltsin signed legislation in both 1996 and 1999 reaffirming the supremacy of the federal 
Constitution over the treaties, little has been done to ensure that this occurs.  
Additionally, while the treaties were initially used to buy off the regions, “the treaties and 
agreements themselves amount to a rather inconsistent and vague regional policy 
conditioned more by demands placed on the central government than any cohesive 
federal government strategy aimed at containing only the most rebellious regions.”34  The 
ambiguity of the treaties in relation to the Constitution and the Federation Treaty has only 
served to further complicate Russia’s center-periphery relations. 
However, it has also been argued that the treaties have benefited the Russian 
Federation insofar as they have limited secessionist tendencies.  The treaties have been 
successful in accomplishing this because their bilateral nature allows Moscow to tailor 
the agreement to the particular interests of the regions, considering their differing 
economic development, strategic location, culture, and ethnicity.35  While this may 
indeed be the case, Moscow has not succeeded in restraining the regions without a price, 
as it appears that the treaty process has largely favored the regional governments over the 
central government. 
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To the extent that the bilateral treaties were intended to restrain the regions, or at 
least to provide stability and predictability to center-periphery relations in Russia, they 
failed.  This failure has resulted in large part from the inability of the central government 
to fulfill its responsibilities in areas of federal jurisdiction.  The vacuum created by a lack 
of central leadership in the years after the signing of the treaties was only exacerbated by 
the 1998 financial crisis, which served as an accelerator to regionalization.  In the wake 
of the crisis, the central government failed to provide assistance or guidance to the 
regions, resulting in attempts by the regions to look out for their own interests at 
everyone else’s expense.36  The extent to which power devolved to the regions during 
this time is evidenced by concerns at the time that Russia was progressing towards either 
a confederation, or even worse, disintegration. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of any framework to guide center-periphery relations in the years 
immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s regions succeeded in 
grasping a tremendous amount of power over functions that had previously fallen under 
the sole jurisdiction of the central government.  As a result, all attempts by the central 
government to reexert control since then have encountered the difficult challenge of 
wresting power from the regions.  The multiple attempts of delineating the appropriate 
federal and regional spheres of power appear to have been nothing more than short-
sighted band-aids attempting to staunch the devolution of power to the periphery, without 
providing Russia with a definitive legal framework to guide and resolve center-periphery 
issues.  The uphill battle of the center against the regions prevented Russia from carrying 
out a much needed overhaul of their antiquated asymmetrical federal structure.  The 
dangers to Russia’s security and stability that were created by the aforementioned failures 
of the central government will become readily apparent in the chapters that follow.  
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III. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONALISM:  THE RISE 
OF REGIONAL TSARS? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As Russia began the transition from an overly centralized state to a federal state, 
regionalism was viewed in a favorable light.  It was thought that the foundation of 
regional centers of power would serve as a check on the central government, thus 
preventing the rebirth of authoritarianism in Russia and furthering democracy.  In truth, 
regionalism, leading to federalism, has had mixed results for the emergence of democracy 
in Russia’s regions.  Instead of fostering democracy from the bottom up, regionalism has 
led to the emergence of authoritarian regimes in one-third of Russia’s regions.37  Lacking 
both horizontal and vertical checks on the power of the regional leaders, the degree to 
which democracy prevails is left to the discretion of those leaders.  While in some rare 
cases regional leaders have promoted, or at least not impeded, democracy in their regions, 
it is far more common to find regional leaders who will do whatever is necessary to 
maintain their power.  As a result, such things as rule of law, free press, free and fair 
elections, and respected human rights have suffered tremendously.  This chapter, through 
an examination of the extent to which regional tsars have emerged, will also illuminate 
the rotten foundations of Russia’s federal structure.  Without a strong, equitable, and 
enforceable framework guiding center-periphery relations in Russia, the regions will no 
doubt succeed in enhancing their own power at the expense of democracy in Russia.    
B. FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
Federalism is generally considered to be beneficial to democratization, because it 
“‘curbs arbitrary rule, both at the center and locally.  It decentralizes responsibility while 
providing a mechanism to restrain potential local conflicts and abuses.  It provides a 
school of democracy, and it quite literally brings government closer to the people.’”38  As 
such, it would seem that a federal structure was exactly what Russia needed.  
Unfortunately, though, the legal framework guiding Russia’s federal relations emerged 
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slowly and with great ambiguity.  As a result, the early 1990s allowed the regions the 
opportunity to develop their local governments as they saw fit, with little oversight from 
the central government.  The emergence of regional governments with a great deal of 
autonomy from the central government has “led the regions more often in the direction of 
dictatorship than democracy.”39  The implementation of a federal system of government, 
with the intended purpose of limiting the power of the central government instead had the 
unintended result of creating a multitude of local tyrants.  
The 1993 Constitution permitted the regions to determine their own state 
institutions, thus allowing for diversity amongst the electoral systems of the regions and 
varying balances of power between the legislative and executive branches.40  However, 
the federal government retained means by which to check the power of the local 
governments.  Most controversial, was the constitutional provision stating that “‘Federal 
executive bodies and bodies of the executive authority of the members of the Russian 
Federation shall form a single system of executive authority.’”41  This allowed for the 
presidential appointment of regional executives.  The relationship between regional and 
federal executives became ambiguous when ethnic republics were provided the 
opportunity to elect their executive as early as 1991, while the territorially based regions 
had executives appointed by Moscow until 1995 when local elections were held.  This 
only served to further undermine the Constitution, which considered all components of 
the federation to be equals.  
The central government was provided further oversight of the regions through the 
Constitution, which allowed the Russian President to “‘suspend acts of executive bodies 
of Russian Federation members if they contradict the Constitution, federal laws or 
international obligation of the Russian Federation or constitute a breach of human and 
civil rights and freedoms, until the matter is decided by the appropriate court.’”42  In 
practice, however, President Yeltsin was reluctant to interfere in the regional 
governments.  Despite frequent violations of democratic norms by regional governments, 
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Yeltsin needed the support of the regional executives, thus allowing them the freedom to 
rule as they saw fit.  Even if Yeltsin did have the desire to regulate the violation of human 
and civil rights and freedoms in the regions, it is doubtful that capable enforcement 
mechanisms could have been found.  The ambiguous implementation and enforcement of 
the legal framework guiding the actions of local executives thus provided them with the 
means to rule as they wished, with the all too frequent result being an authoritarian-style 
regime. 
C. BENEFITS OF REGIONALISM TO DEMOCRACY 
In respect to democracy in the whole of Russia, federalism has succeeded in 
limiting the power of the central government.  However, at the regional level, the 
democratic benefits of regionalism are much more difficult to find.  It appears that many 
of the regions that are characterized as progressive, are labeled this because of their 
economic, not political, reforms.  However, even in those regions that are less liberal, 
they are somewhat democratic insofar as elections, although often unfair, frequently 
contain some amount of competition and uncertainty.  Additionally, in the 1995/96 
gubernatorial elections many incumbents lost their posts, thus providing evidence of 
competitive elections.43 
In a few regions, local leaders have contributed to the advancement of free press 
and free and fair elections.  Characteristically, in Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, Samara, and 
Moscow oblasts “there is intensive competition between several actors.  Power is shared 
among dominant and subdominant actors within a formal institutional network, and 
elections provide the method of sorting out political collisions.”44  In particular, Samara 
has regular municipal elections, more than 3000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
and local media that support the governor’s rival.45  However, even these regions 
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experience problems with manipulated elections and controls on the press, as will be later 
demonstrated. 
Some regional governments are also succeeding in responding to the needs of 
their population when the central government defaults on its obligations.  Most common 
is the creation of regional social welfare programs, which are intended to be under the 
joint jurisdiction of the federal and regional governments.  In the absence of a federal 
need-based program, some regions, such as Tatarstan, are creating their own need-based 
social welfare programs.46  Similarly, in an effort to further provide for his constituents, 
the Samara governor, Konstantin Titov, authorized extra pensions in his region.47  
Despite his seemingly good intentions though, his actions further demonstrated a 
disregard for Russia’s legal framework by intervening in an area of federal jurisdiction.  
Thus, these initiatives, though representing attempts to provide for their constituents, also 
demonstrate the ambivalence with which many regional leaders approach the legal 
framework that regulates their power.  In these cases, the regional leaders’ expansion of 
power at least had positive effects; however, as the next section shows, this is not always 
the case. 
D. DANGERS OF REGIONALISM FOR DEMOCRACY 
1. Elections 
Contrary to the sparse evidence of democratic reforms in the regions, violations of 
democratic norms are all too frequent.  The ethnic republics, which first began to elect 
their presidents in 1991, appear to be the trendsetters.  Although democracy initially 
seemed to take hold in the ethnic republics, as evidenced by relatively competitive 
presidential elections early on, the leaders of the republics “have actually reversed these 
‘democratic’ gains, cracking down on opponents and gutting local elections of any real 
choice.”48  The territorially based regions, which first held gubernatorial elections in 
                                                 
46 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy:  The Process of Devolution in 
Russia, “ Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo No. 39 (November 1998):  3; 
internet; available from http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/stoner-weiss39.html; 
accessed 30 May 2001. 
47 Yelena Kornysheva, “Moscow Objects to Samara Extra Pension Payments,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 
16 November 1999 [database on-line]; available from FBIS. 
48 Hale, 2. 
19 
1995 and 1996, seem to be following the example of the republics, with leaders not 
“learning how to contest elections more effectively, but [rather] how to thwart them.”49   
Many of the actions of the regional leaders that hinder the development of 
democracy revolve around the desire to maintain or increase their power.  Fortunately, 
the regional leaders seem to feel obligated to maintain at least a façade of democracy, 
thus necessitating elections of some sort.  By presenting a “democratic veneer” the 
regional leaders are able to limit the chances of federal intervention in their region.50  
However, the elections that do occur are full of abuses, to include such things a excluding 
the participation of opponents in elections, impeding others’ campaigns, and 
manipulating the results.     
Perhaps the easiest way for incumbents to manipulate elections is through “dirty 
tricks.”  Instead of focusing on issues, candidates instead attempt to achieve the 
advantage over their opponents by a variety of unethical actions.  Most of these are 
relatively benign, to include the utilization of phony popularity ratings, anonymous 
letters, bogus leaflets, signs accusing opponents of theft, pedophilia, and homosexuality, 
and the practice of handing out campaign literature with pension payments.51  More 
aggressive incumbents seek to influence voters by suddenly finding the money, no doubt 
through illegal sources, for a variety of ‘good deeds’ to include such things as sending 
doctors out to villages, paving roads, and installing gas lines to remote villages.52  
Unfortunately, some incumbents have found it necessary to further impede their 
opponents’ campaigns by more intrusive means.  Exemplifying this, the president of 
Bashkortostan, Murtaza Rakhimov, managed to have all of his serious opponents 
removed from the ballot in a June 1998 presidential election.53  The one opponent that 
was allowed to remain in the election was Rakhimov’s forestry minister.  It also appears 
that in order to further ensure his victory, the Bashkir Central Electoral Commission 
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(under the control of Rakhimov) printed three times as many ballots as there were eligible 
voters.54   Rakhimov’s machinations marked a significant setback for democracy in 
Bashkortostan, which had experienced a comparatively more fair and competitive 
presidential election in 1993.  Unfortunately, the lesson Rakhimov had learned from the 
1993 election, which turned into a real race despite Rakhimov’s maneuvering, was that 
“he could not fight and win in a truly competitively race…[and that] he should have been 
more careful in making sure that no serious candidate could oppose him in the first 
place.”55  
Electoral abuses are not limited to the ethnic republics, with many of the 
territorially based regions providing serious competition for recognition as the most 
corrupt region.  Similar to what occurred in Bashkortostan, the governor of Primorskii 
krai, Evgeny Nazdratenko, had several candidates removed from the ballot just days 
before the December 1999 gubernatorial election.56  Additionally, in order to undermine 
the authority of his chief political opponent, Vladivostok mayor Viktor Cherepkov, 
Nazdratenko turned off the water and electrical power in Vladivostok and sabotaged its 
heating system, only to later have Cherepkov evicted from his office.57 
In more subtle attempts to influence the outcomes of elections, incumbents 
manipulate local election laws, often resulting in laws that violate federal law.  For 
example, while federal law prohibits uncontested elections, Tatarstan, Kalmykiia, and 
Kabardino-Balkaria have all violated this law, with the president of Tatarstan having 
been elected to office twice in uncontested elections.58  Similarly, federal law stipulates 
that the acceptable minimum turnout for elections to be considered valid is 25 percent.  
However, regions have varyingly altered this law so that regional elections require 
anywhere from a mere 15 percent minimum turnout, to as high as a 50 percent minimum 
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turnout in others.59  Thus, in the absence of any denunciation from Moscow, the regions 
are left with the impression that federal laws guiding their behavior do not need to be 
respected.   
The net result of the machinations of regional leaders is elections that exist in 
name only.  Through their early experiences with executive elections, the ethnic republics 
found that as long as they continued to hold elections, thus maintaining a façade of 
democracy, the central government would do little if anything to punish their attempts to 
directly and/or indirectly manipulate the outcomes of the elections.  Having been forced 
to wait until 1995 to hold their first executive elections, the territorially based regions 
were well aware of the electoral abuses being permitted in the ethnic republics.  They 
learned from the republics and readily began manipulating their own elections, so well so 
that the incumbent governors in several oblasts, to include Orel and Moscow, have won 
their elections with over 90 percent of the votes.60 
If candidates wish to challenge the illegal actions of the regional leaders they 
must turn to the regional court system.  Although the courts, as will be discussed later, 
are increasingly coming under the sway of the regional leaders, they do seem to be able 
to check the most severe electoral abuses.  For example, the governor of Koryak 
autonomous okrug, attempted to declare emergency rule after losing to his opponent in 
the 1996 gubernatorial elections; however, the court intervened and forced him to step 
down.61  Similarly, when the president of Marii-El Republic attempted to cancel the 
region’s election for chief executive, the region’s supreme court overturned the decree.62  
These cases appear to be rare instances of judicial intervention, occurring perhaps only 
because the two regional leaders’ actions would have destroyed the semblance of 
democracy in their respective regions.  More recently, the courts seem to have become 
more active in regulating the elections, which has helped to restrain the candidates’ 
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campaign activities.63  However, due to the extent to which regional leaders control the 
courts, the decisions of the courts tend to reflect the desires of the regional leadership.     
2. Media 
In their efforts to maintain and expand their power, regional governors frequently 
infringe on the freedom of the local press in their regions.  With regional media 
dependent on federal subsidies which flow through the governors, regional leaders found 
they could exert control over the press, ensuring favorable coverage for themselves.  
Characteristically, in 1999 a local media company in Yaroslavl was told that if their 
television programs did not stop criticizing the local authorities and the governor, 
Anatoly Lisitsyn, they would lose their funding.64  
Violations of the press’ freedom have been particularly severe in Primorskii krai, 
even as early as 1993.  Nazdratenko, who was governor of the region until February 
2001, closed newspapers that were critical of him, stopped a TV channel from 
broadcasting after showing compromising video of him, and even hired criminal gangs to 
beat up critical journalists.65  Such violations are not unique to Primorskii krai, however, 
as the firing of unsubmissive editors and journalists is a common occurrence in many 
regions.66  In perhaps the most drastic case of all, aides to the president of Kalmykiia, 
Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, were arrested by federal authorities for the murder of a reporter who 
had been investigating the corruption of Ilyumzhinov’s administration.67  Ilyumzhinov, 
of course, remains in power.   
During election campaigns the regional press is further utilized to not only 
promote the incumbent, but also to eliminate the prospects of the opponents receiving any 
favorable press or media access.  In Bashkortostan, the public is provided with a pro-
Rakhimov paper free of charge, while a pro-opposition paper was banned from being 
                                                 
63 Aleksei Makarkin, “Governors and Mayors are Being Elected in Court,” The Current Digest of the 
Post-Soviet Press 53, no. 17 (23 May 2001), 15. 
64 Petr Akopov, “No Independent Media in Provinces,” Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta (27 April 1999) 
[database on-line]; available from FBIS. 
65 Kirkow, 937. 
66 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Roman Levita, and Mkhail Loiberg, From Submission to Rebellion 
(Boulder:  Westview Press, 1997), 210. 
67 Whitmore, 73. 
23 
published in the region.68  Even in Samara, which is considered to be a more liberal 
region, the local media were warned by an employee of the gubernatorial press service 
prior to the gubernatorial campaign in 2000 that “if they wanted to live in Samara 
tomorrow, there must be no doubt of their loyalty to the retired governor,” who was 
running for a seat he had previously given up.69   
Much of the governors’ ability to control the press is derived from the press’ 
financial dependence on the regional government, which has increased in recent years.  In 
the early 1990s, regional media frequently established relationships with local businesses 
and regional banks in order to avoid being unduly influenced by local authorities and 
power industrial groups.70  This tactic provided the press in the regions with some degree 
of freedom.  However, this all changed with the financial crisis of 1998.  In the wake of 
the crisis, the media lost its alternative sources of funding, paper and printing costs 
skyrocketed, advertising revenue decreased, and the tax breaks and subsidies from the 
federal government were cut.71  As a result of rising costs and decreased alternatives for 
funding, the regional governors “obtained affordable paper and printing services for 
publications they favored, effectively gaining the power to censor local newspapers.”72      
The secretary of the Russian Union of Journalists just recently commented that 
the “‘the signal coming out of Moscow today is telling regional authorities they can deal 
with the media as they like.’”73  It does appear, though, that Moscow has recognized the 
lack of free press in the regions, and is taking some action to rectify the situation.  A 
federal law was passed in early 2000, which allows for local publications to receive 
funding directly from the federal government, instead of through the regions.74  While the 
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law certainly will not eliminate the regional leaders’ ability to influence the content of the 
press, it does serve to limit to some extent their financial hold over the media.  
3. Human Rights Abuses 
In their efforts to maintain and expand their power, regional leaders are 
increasingly disregarding human rights in their regions, through direct action, and 
indirectly through their self-centered pursuit of power.  Unfortunately, “there were no 
advantages in regionalization for ordinary people’s human rights…[because] without a 
strong center able to protect citizens against the arbitrarinesss of local officials…the 
regional elite found it possible to violate individual human rights much more than in the 
past.”75  Exemplifying a blatant disregard for human rights, during the campaign for 
republic president in Bashkortostan in 1998, incumbent President Rakhimov had 
approximately sixty free-speech demonstrators in the republic’s capital arrested.76  In 
another case, the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, along with other regional leaders 
reintroduced the propiska system, which limited individuals’ freedom of movement by 
requiring the would-be residents to register.77  The Saratov governor also infringed on 
individuals’ rights when he ordered all of the region’s civil servants to join his political 
party, Yedinstvo, or risk losing their jobs.78  The scale of the problem is best exemplified 
by Voronezh, where in 1998 it was determined that 399 regional directives violated 
human rights.79 
All too often in the pursuit of more power and prestige, the regional executives 
fail to examine, or simply disregard, the wider implications of their actions for the 
population of their respective region.  No case better demonstrates this than the actions of 
Nazdratenko, the governor of Primorskii krai, who has been accused of “illiterate and 
shortsighted policies that led to people’s suffering.”80  In particular, Nazdratenko failed 
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to ensure that the region’s utility bills were paid, resulting in energy shortages year after 
year and people freezing to death.81  While the region was short on funds, Nazdratenko 
ensured that he was not, as evidenced by a $1 million prize he received “for his work as 
one of the world’s great leaders,” which in reality was more likely “simply a device to 
transfer state money to Mr. Nazdratanko.”82   
4. Rule of Law 
In addition to violating human rights in the regions, regional leaders also have 
little respect for both regional and federal laws.  Violations of the 1993 Constitution are 
perhaps most pervasive, with the ethnic republics leading the way.  The constitutions of 
the ethnic republics frequently contradict the federal Constitution on a variety of 
measures to include allowing republics to be considered subjects of international law, 
providing republics the right to secession, and allowing republics to conduct their own 
foreign policy and conclude international treaties and agreements.83 In all, the 
constitutions of nineteen of the twenty-one ethnic republics contain measures that violate 
the federal Constitution.84 
Disregard for federal legislation is also a problem, as evidenced by an 
examination of regional legislation from 1995 to 1997, which determined that half of the 
44,000 acts violated either the Russian Constitution or federal legislation.85  In one okrug 
alone there are 324 laws and statutes that violate federal law.86  Several regions have 
challenged the supremacy of federal law, with Sakha requiring that all federal legislation 
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be passed in the lower chamber of its parliament before it becomes law within the region, 
and other regions reserving the right to suspend federal legislation altogether.87 
While in some cases the passage of regional laws that violate federal laws does 
indeed represent a blatant disrespect for the federal laws, other contradictions may be 
unintentional and unknown.  Frequently, the federal government fails to inform the 
regions about new federal legislation.88  Additionally, some the violations of federal 
legislation may result from the federal government defaulting on its obligations.  When 
the federal government does not take action in some of its spheres of power, the regions 
seek to fill the void.89  The fact remains, though, that whatever the cause of or 
justification for the violation of federal laws, the federal government is not enforcing the 
supremacy of its laws.  As a result of the lack of oversight and enforcement from the 
federal government, as well as due to the contradictions within the federal legal 
framework, regional authorities are able to interpret federal law to their own advantage 
and violate it without fear of punishment.90    
In addition to showing little regard for federal law, regional leaders also are 
violating their own regional laws.  For example, the previously mentioned Saratov 
governor, who ordered civil servants in the region to join his political party, did so in 
violation of a regional law “which mandates that the civil service is not based on party 
membership.”91  With few horizontal checks on their power, regional leaders pick and 
choose which laws they will follow.   
5. Gubernatorial Elections 
As previously mentioned, although the presidents of the republics were elected as 
early as 1991, the governors of the territorially based regions were appointed by President 
Yeltsin until 1995.  Until that time, the appointment of governors provided Yeltsin with a 
means to check the power of the local leaders.  However, it was thought that the 
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introductions of elections would make the regional leaders more accountable to their 
constituents.  Unfortunately, instead of constraining the behavior of the governors by 
making them answerable to their constituents, the governors instead “ruled like 
monarchs, using pocket parliaments, corrupted regional law enforcement bodies, and 
local mafias as vassals to carry out their will.”92   
 Not only did the elections provide the governors with more freedom to exercise 
their will within their region, but they also made it more difficult for the Russian 
president to discipline and/or remove them.  This problem was further exacerbated by 
Yeltsin’s decision in 1995 to have the Federation Council composed of the top legislator 
and executive in each region.  As members of the Federation Council, the regional 
leaders received immunity from prosecution, thus allowing them the freedom to act as 
they wished in their regions, without having to fear legal reprisal.93   
Yeltsin announced that “he would ‘respect the choice of the Russians’ and 
cooperate will all elected governors,” and that “the most important outcome of the 
elections…was that for the first time in history, the Russian people had chosen their own 
leaders.”94  However, he also warned the governors that “ ‘there are a lot of bosses who 
got big powers and immediately opened up their big pockets.  They think they are far 
away from Moscow and there will be no control over them.  They are wrong.  We will 
start checking…and slap their hands to teach them a lesson.’”95  Despite these warnings, 
though, the governors remained largely outside of the control of Moscow, with few 
vertical checks on their power. 
6. Vertical Checks on Abuses 
It would be a mistake to think that the abuses of regional power only began once 
the regional governors were elected.  The previous descriptions of electoral, media, 
human rights, and legal abuses show that the regional leaders were exceeding their 
bounds as soon as the Soviet Union collapsed.  As early as 1991, Yeltsin recognized the 
growing abuse of power in the regions and created the position of presidential envoy.  
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These envoys were to “bring home presidential and government decisions to the local 
administrators and dispatch objective information about the actual state of things 
there.”96  The envoys were an ineffective check on regional power, as even when they did 
identify cases in which federal laws were not being implemented, the federal government 
took no action to rectify the situation.97  Additionally, instead of fostering cooperation 
between the federal and regional levels of government, the presidential representatives 
only created resentment in the regions, with them being viewed as “a powerless and 
unnecessary infringement on the authority of elected governments in the provinces.”98 
The Constitutional Court represents an additional federal check on regional 
abuses of power.  However, the court has yet to effectively fulfill this role due to both 
difficulties in reconciling the various determinants of regional power (1992 Federation 
Treaty, 1993 Constitution, and bilateral treaties) and in ensuring that its rulings are 
implemented.  In some cases, the Constitutional Court has successfully ruled against the 
abuses of the regional governments, to include a case in January 1997 in which it ruled 
against Udmurtia’s decision to abolish local elected government.99  This time, the court’s 
decision was implemented by the regional government, but only after Yeltsin pressured 
the region to comply.  Unfortunately, all too frequently the court’s decisions are left 
unfulfilled.  In April 1996, the Constitutional Court ruled against the aforementioned 
propiska system that various regions had implemented, thus restricting the right of free 
movement.100  However, the court’s decision was never enforced, and the propiska 
system endured.   
The credibility of the Constitutional Court, already hindered by the 
unenforceability of its decisions, suffered further from the signing of the bilateral treaties 
in 1994 through 1999.  Because the treaties contain a variety of provisions that contradict 
the federal Constitution, the court encounters difficulties in dealing with the regions’ 
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violations of the federal Constitution which are covered by their respective bilateral 
treaties.101  As a result of the regions’ propensity to disregard the Constitutional Court 
and due to the ambiguity of the legal framework it is supposed to enforce, the court 
“remains an ineffective body for stemming the rising tide of regional autonomy.”102   
The ineffectiveness of the federal checks on regional power is exacerbated by the 
presence of the Federation Council.  After the change in its composition in 1995, 
resulting in the chief regional executive and legislator in each region becoming the 
regions’ representatives in the Federation Council, the Federation Council has grown into 
a stronghold of regional interests.  As such, they tend to support governors in their 
disputes with Moscow, to include the authoritarian governor Nazdratenko, and reject any 
federal encroachment on regional affairs.103  As a result, the Federation Council serves 
“‘as a constitutional check on any legislative attempts by the Russian president or 
government to alter the balance of power between regions and the center.’”104  This may 
change as Putin’s reforms altering the composition of the Federation Council, to be 
discussed later, are implemented.  However, in the near term, the Federation Council will 
remain an obstacle to attempts to rein in the regions. 
7. Horizontal Checks on Abuses 
As ineffective as vertical checks on the abuses of the regional leaders’ power have 
been, horizontal checks within the regions have been even more so.  All too frequently, 
regional executives have expanded their power to such an extent that, through a variety of 
means, they are able to exert control over the regional legislative and judicial bodies.  As 
a result, the regional leaders are able to further exploit their government position. 
Regional leaders gain control over the legislative bodies in their regions by taking 
such measures as creating legislatures whose members are appointed instead of being 
elected, by allowing members of their administrations to be legislators, and by 
manipulating the structure and districting of the legislature, among other things.  Perhaps 
the actions of Kalmykiia president Kirsan Ilyumzhinov represent the most blatant 
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example of the neutralization of the legislature by a regional leader.  As early as 1993, 
Ilyumzhinov had already replaced Kalmykiia’s parliament with a smaller legislative 
body, which was then composed of “just thirty or so unelected deputies, personally 
selected by the President.”105  Regions such as Bashkortostan and Kareliia have created 
upper chambers in their regional assemblies for the sole purpose of incorporating the 
heads of the local administration in the legislative branch, with appointments made by the 
region’s president or governor.106  In other cases, the subjugation of the parliament is 
achieved more indirectly through the resources of the executive branch.  Because the 
regional leaders control the media and financial resources in the region, they can ensure 
that those candidates they favor for the legislature receive the requisite funding and 
publicity, while those they dislike do not.  The end result is that members of the 
legislature owe allegiance to the regional leaders.  This was the case in Orlovskaia oblast, 
with the net result being a parliament that “instead of providing checks and balances to 
the executive power…became an additional instrument of the [governor’s] power.”107   
The pervasiveness of the regional leaders’ control is further enhanced by the 
subjugation of the regional judiciaries.  The courts in the regions are poorly financed by 
the federal budget, thus making them “beholden to equally stingy but more-corrupt 
regional authorities.”108  The utilization of regional funds to finance the courts has 
undermined their independence and is also contrary to the 1993 Constitution, which 
requires the funding for courts to come only from the federal budget.109  Thus, regional 
leaders continue to influence the decisions of the regional courts, perpetuating  “the long-
standing Soviet tradition of ‘telephone law’, whereby the local judiciary operated at the 
behest of the local Communist Party boss.”110  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Instead of fostering democracy in Russia’s regions, federalism has provided 
Russia’s regional leaders with a free hand to rule as they see fit within their domains.  
The absence of a framework to guide center-periphery relations in the early 1990s, 
combined with the ambiguous and inadequate framework that eventually emerged, 
allowed the regional leaders to grasp as much power as they could from the federal 
government.  As a result of the tremendous power they acquired during this time, the 
regional leaders were able to effectively eliminate any horizontal checks on their power.  
Additionally, they learned that by maintaining at least a veneer of democracy they could 
limit the interference of the federal government in their regions.  The emergence of 
regional tsars has significantly impeded the development of democracy within the 
regions.  Also, because the behavior of the regional leaders has not been constrained, they 
are only been further encouraged to expand their influence into increasingly broader 
realms.  As we will see in the next chapter, this expansion could potentially undermine 
the policies of the federal government and threatens the security and stability of the 
country.      
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
33 
IV. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONALISM:  THE 
MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of regional tsars, brought about by the devolution of power away 
from the central government has also significantly impacted Russia’s ability to control 
functions that are intended to be the responsibility of Moscow.  Of particular concern, is 
the ability of the central government to exert influence over the military and foreign 
policy.  While these functions are assigned to the federal government by the 1993 
Constitution, the regions have increasingly sought out ways to extend their influence into 
these spheres.  Although in some cases the regions’ actions in these areas may in actuality 
benefit Russia, it is much more common for the regions’ actions to undermine the federal 
government, resulting in threats to the security and stability of Russia.  The inability of 
Russia to regulate the regions’ influence in these spheres also presents significant 
dilemmas for any countries that interact with Russia, to include the United States, as they 
must determine to what extent the regions should be incorporated into diplomatic 
activities. 
B. REGIONALISM’S INFLUENCE ON THE MILITARY 
1. Background 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regions have increasingly gained 
influence over the armed forces stationed on their territory.  Some of the expansion of the 
regional leaders’ power into the sphere of the military has occurred out of necessity, 
resulting in cooperation between the military and local leaders.  However, in other cases, 
the motives behind the regions’ actions appear to be founded less on survival strategies 
than on a desire to simply gain more power.  Regardless of motives, though, the 
regionalization of the military poses serious threats to Russian security of a type unheard 
of in Russia’s past, when “rulers, before and after the revolution, were adamant about the 
idea that the army must obey only the center and in no way serve the whims of local 
authorities.”111  Furthermore, many of the regions’ actions violate the federal 
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Constitution, which designates defense and security policy as a function under the sole 
jurisdiction of the federal government. 
2. Military/Regional Cooperation 
With the living conditions of soldiers and officers growing increasingly worse, the 
military leadership looks to alternative sources to provide for their troops.  In particular, 
the regions are playing a more significant role than ever before in enhancing the well-
being of the military.  Evidence abounds of the poor living conditions of the men.  Due in 
large part to Russia’s weak economy, as well as corruption in the central government, the 
soldiers often do not receive sufficient supplies.  Exemplifying this is the lack of food 
given the troops.  During just the first two months of 1999, “the amount of money 
appropriated for food purchases was enough for only 17 days. . .[and] supply officers 
scrambling to find additional resources [were] making titanic efforts to provide their 
soldiers with meals that meet minimal nutritional standards.”112    
As the military leadership seeks out ways to provide for the troops, they are 
progressively turning to the regions for assistance, particularly due to the failure of the 
center to remain accountable for the needs of the military.  According to Stephen Blank, 
“both necessity and central encouragement have led officers and regional authorities to 
work with each other to supply those needs, often bypassing Moscow.”113  In some cases, 
the central government actually requests the help of the regions in providing for the 
troops, as was the case in December 1995 when Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov 
requested the assistance of Stavropol’s Territorial Administration in providing for the 
54th division of MVD troops stationed there.114  In other situations, the regions take the 
initiative to provide for the troops, as was the case in 1996, when “Sakhalin’s local 
government decided to help the border troops and took up a collection from state and 
private enterprises.”115   
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At times, the regional officials have actually received various rewards for 
assisting in providing supplies to the troops stationed on their territory.  In 1995, the 
governor of Volgograd assisted in providing supplies to its local troops who were 
fighting in Chechnya.116  In return, the central government permitted the government of 
Volgograd to withhold some of its federal taxes, in order for the region to further assist 
the troops.117  Such interdependence between the military and the regional governments 
has become prevalent throughout Russia.  Not only do many regions help with food and 
housing, but some also assist in providing energy and other vital supplies to the military 
and in funding both the local military commissars and the call-up and training of 
reserves.118   
The benefits that the regions reap are both direct and indirect.  In exchange for the 
military assistance provided by the regions, and in addition to allowing the regions to 
withhold some taxes, Moscow has also forgiven wage arrears or allowed the military 
forces in a region to assist with the harvest and other economic activities.119  Because 
military service continues to be compulsory in Russia, many families are concerned about 
the treatment their sons receive while in the military.  As a result, assistance provided to 
the military by a regional governor is a smart political move, resulting in the indirect 
benefit of increased political support and greater visibility at the national level.120     
3. Self-centered Regions 
Initially, it may appear that by the center empowering the regions to assist the 
military, through such things as tax breaks, the military will be better provided for.  In 
many cases this is indeed true.  However, we must also account for the quality of 
leadership in the regions.  The autocratic leaders in charge in some of the regions care 
little about providing for the military.  In one particular case, officials in Siberia received 
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money from the center targeted for helping to support the troops stationed there.121  
Instead of using the money for its intended purposes, “some local leaders ignored 
soldiers’ interests and pocketed the money for themselves, obstructing the provision of 
basic supplies.”122 
Often times, local leaders act with their own interests in mind, neglecting to 
consider the wider implications of their actions.  As a result, actions taken by the center 
to empower the regions, such as the transfer of control of the national electric power grid 
from the center to the regions, pose potential threats to the security of both the Russian 
military and that of other countries.  A failure of regional officials to pay the wages of 
coal miners in Vladivostok in May of 1997, resulted in a miners strike, which in turn led 
to the need to shut off the power to various locations.123  Unfortunately, among the 
various locations without power were “military ones, ensuring the country’s security.”124  
Increasingly, such things as electricity have become tools in political battles between the 
regional governors, who want more federal subsidies, and Moscow, while the broader 
consequences of their actions are disregarded.125   
As power devolves to the regions, soldiers occasionally lose benefits they 
possessed with a centralized government.  In one scenario in the Far East, regional 
officials in Khabarovsk ceased to give military men free train tickets, because the 
Ministry of Defense had not paid its bills.126  With the central government no longer 
economically strong enough to provide its military with extra benefits, the regions are 
taking control of their own economies to ensure that federal officials will no longer 
“boost Moscow’s economy at the expense of the rest of the country.”127  In these 
                                                 
121 Blank, “Russia’s Armed Forces on the Brink of Reform,” 30. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Boris Reznik, “Crisis in Maritime Territory,” Russian Press Digest, 17 May 1997 [database on-
line]; available from Lexis-Nexis. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Lucy Jones, “Power Cuts Make Surgery a Gamble in Far East,” The Moscow Times, 30 May 1997 
[database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis. 
126 Suzanne Possehl, “Russia’s Far East Goes Its Own Way,” Journal of Commerce, 24 August 1998 
[database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis. 
127 Ibid. 
37 
economic and political battles between the center and the regions, it is the military and 
national security that suffer.   
4. Possibilities of Regional Control over the Military 
While cooperative efforts between the military and local governments is viewed 
favorably by the central government, concerns do exist that the growing interdependence 
between the military and the regions could eventually result in the regions gaining the 
ability to influence and even control the military.  As the regions increasingly provide for 
the well-being of the troops, the military could potentially transfer their loyalties to their 
providers:  the regional governments.  In addition, the more that the military withdraws 
from the center’s sphere of influence, the more difficult it will be for Moscow to reexert 
control over the military in order to mobilize resources or even simply rebuild the 
Russian military.128  In addition to readiness and coordination suffering, Russia will face 
increasingly greater difficulties in planning “on a national basis for any kind of economic, 
military, or strategic operation.”129    
With the regions providing for the soldiers, “It is quite possible that if an 
emergency situation occurs these military units will betray their commanders in favor of 
the territorial administration.”130  This would result in local leaders possessing the ability 
to control military units that remain quite powerful.  As discussed earlier, many of the 
regional leaders are not as rational and democratically minded as even the central 
government.  The possible result of this could be, that with a regional governor acting as 
a “virtual tsar who answers to nobody and controls immense resources and power, we can 
see some preconditions for warlordism.”131 
Fear abounds that Russian politics will be remilitarized “not so much by armed 
forces as by would-be political leaders using them for private purposes.”132  For example, 
military forces loyal to a regional leader may be used “to support him in a bid for power 
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or secession.”133  Already in Russia, “militaries participate in partisan politics and 
foreign policy, attack state policy, and form coalitions with disaffected regional leaders 
with impunity.”134  Such trends, if left unchecked, could no doubt create significant 
problems for the federal government in the future. 
However, despite the growing interdependence between the military and the 
regions, it appears unlikely that any sort of alliance resulting in the military forcefully 
backing a political leader will occur.  Historically, Russia does not have a tradition of 
military intervention in politics.135  Additionally, it would be difficult to execute in 
practicality.  Because Russia’s military districts do not coincide with its administrative 
divisions, any military-political alliance against the center would necessitate unlikely 
coordination between the regional leaders in the territories comprising the military 
district.136  In addition to the difficulties that would need to be overcome in forming such 
an alliance, it is doubtful that political leaders would “jeopardize their privileges by 
militarily challenging the center.”137 
Despite the unlikelihood of the military shifting their loyalties to the regions, 
some regional officials have gained a greater role in the activities of the forces stationed 
on their territory.   In the case of the Siberian Military District, in reciprocity for the aid 
that the regions provide, the military district seeks out the prior approval of the regional 
governments for their activities.138  This would seem to indicate that power is being 
ceded to, rather than being taken by, the regions.     
Of far greater concern are unilateral actions taken by the regions to exert control 
over the military stationed on their territory.  Tatarstan demonstrated such a tendency in 
the early 1990s when the region “recalled its citizens from areas of interethnic 
conflict…and subsequently adopted legislation on military service that directly conflicted 
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with federal statutes.”139  The region continues to exert influence over the military, as 
evidenced by action taken by Tatarstan officials in September 1999 to suspend 
conscription in their territory.140  This occurred as a result of Moscow violating its 
promises, and sending new recruits from Tatarstan, with little over forty days of service, 
into combat in Dagestan.141  The serious nature of this action becomes more apparent 
when considering that the Russian military already suffers from a shortage of conscripts, 
even when they do have the support of the regions.  Should more regions follow the lead 
of Tatarstan, Russia’s ability to build a sufficiently strong force structure would be placed 
in a precarious position.   
The actions of regional leaders have also obstructed key national security policies.  
Initial evidence of this arose as a result of the controversial Chechen War of 1994-1996.  
The leader of Chuvashia, “openly challenged Yeltsin’s right to start the war in Chechnya 
and even issued an edict releasing Chuvashian recruits from participating in this war.”142  
Since then, Chuvash officials have banned their conscripts from being sent to dangerous 
areas.143  With regional leaders controlling the actions of their local recruits, the central 
government will only find it increasingly difficult to field a cohesive force.   
5. Possibilities of Regional Control over Nuclear Weapons 
Although the possibility of regional governors controlling the military is 
threatening enough, even more of a concern is the possibility of local officials controlling 
the employment of nuclear weapons positioned in their regions.  In the early 1990s, many 
were concerned that Russia might disintegrate into small nuclear states.  Fortunately, this 
threat has appeared to be much more of a myth than a reality, as such an occurrence 
would create a situation in which   
thousands of weapons and tons of fissile materials would be dispersed to 
new states with little safeguards infrastructure and little experience in 
controlling borders…[and] nuclear research, production, maintenance, and                                                  
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dismantlement facilities, plus uranium enrichment and plutonium 
separation facilities, could be inherited by new, unstable states.144 
While nuclear separatism has not emerged as a credible threat to Russia’s 
security, nuclear regionalism, “the possibility that Russia’s regional leaders might 
establish de facto control over various nuclear assets on their territories,” continues to 
concern Moscow.145  In fact, one possible explanation for a recent proposal for creating a 
Joint Strategic Command is the government’s fears of nuclear regionalism.146  The 
creation of a Joint Strategic Command would centralize the command and control of 
nuclear weapons, thus increasing the security of the weapons and decreasing the 
possibility of them falling under the control of a rogue region.  The possibility of the 
emergence of a nuclear region, though unlikely, must be considered a threat to the 
security of Russia.  Particularly so because it has already been hinted at by the governor 
of the Krasnoyarsk region, Aleksandr Lebed, when in 1998, due to a failure of the central 
government to provide for the officers of a nuclear unit in his province, he stated, “I am 
seriously thinking of establishing territorial jurisdiction over it.  We. . .are not rich yet, 
but in exchange for the status of a nuclear territory, we could feed the formation and 
become a headache for the world community.”147  If Lebed were to take such action, he 
would control three ICBM bases, two plutonium production facilities, and a factory 
producing submarine-launched ballistic missiles.148  In general, though, such threats 
seem to be more accurately characterized as bargaining chips than as actual threats of 
action.   
The real impact of the regional governments on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) may actually be in regards to efforts at dismantlement.  Weapons dismantlement 
programs in Russia have faced obstacles created by the regions in the attempt to gain 
revenue.  Their actions have included such things as “levy[ing] discretionary tariffs as 
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tribute for the use of their infrastructure in WMD dismantlement…[and] unilaterally 
impos[ing] prohibitive transportation taxes that have retarded the transfer of dismantled 
fissile materials to safe storage depots.”149  The actions of the regions have also impeded 
Moscow’s chemical weapons disarmament, undermining the ability of Russia to uphold 
the Chemical Weapons Convention.150 
6. Conclusion 
The cooperative tendencies readily apparent between the regional governments 
and military in Russia appear to be the most prevalent impact that regionalism has had on 
Russia’s military.  However, while regional initiatives to exert some amount of control 
over the military are far fewer, they cannot be completely ignored.  Although many of the 
regions’ actions clearly violate the 1993 Constitution, Russia has done little to bring the 
regions’ actions back in line with the country’s legal framework.  As long as regions are 
left with the impression that the range of acceptable actions expands beyond what the law 
provides for, the possibility of nuclear separatism and/or regional warlordism will 
continue to threaten Russian security. 
C. REGIONALISM’S INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Background 
In addition to extending their influence into military affairs, regional leaders have 
also begun to interject themselves into the sphere of foreign policy.  Increasingly, regions 
are pursuing relations abroad.  Many of the regions’ forays into foreign policy revolve 
around the pursuit of foreign investment, which is acceptable to Moscow.  However, far 
more disconcerting to Moscow is the regions’ involvement in diplomatic matters.  It is 
true that in some cases the regions can be utilized by Moscow as an asset.  Unfortunately, 
though, far more commonly, the regions pursue their own diplomacy, thus undercutting 
Moscow’s ability to produce cohesive foreign policy. 
The inclusion of the regions in foreign affairs, de facto and de jure, sets a new 
precedent for Russia.  During Soviet times, the leaders of even the Union Republics were 
not in a position to comment on or criticize Moscow’s foreign policy, and the regions had 
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even less influence, being limited to participating in “cultural or sporting contacts 
between individual cities or territories.”151  Now, with the regions gaining influence in 
Russia, the regional leaders are attempting to affect foreign policy outcomes by either 
influencing national decisions or circumventing Moscow.152  However, as numerous as 
threats created by regional involvement in foreign policy are, the central government also 
recognizes that the regions’ cannot be entirely excluded from foreign policy issues. 
2. Legal Framework 
As with other areas of center-periphery relations, the legal framework guiding 
regional involvement in the realm of foreign policy leaves room for interpretation.  The 
ambiguity of the framework, combined with the lack of enforcement mechanisms, forms 
the root cause of the regions’ impunity.  The 1993 Constitution declared foreign policy, 
international relations and international treaties, questions of war and peace, and foreign 
economic relations to be under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government.153  The 
Constitution was somewhat more restrictive than the Federation Treaty, which allowed 
for the regions “to enter into agreements and treaties with foreign entities as long as they 
do not contradict the Russian constitution.”154  Adding to the legal confusion, the 
bilateral treaties provided some of the regions with additional concessions in the foreign 
policy realm, to include rights to establish their own consulates abroad and to reach 
agreements with other countries.155  The treaties also required the regions to coordinate 
any foreign policy initiatives with the federal government, though this frequently does 
not occur in practice.   
The final layer of the framework outlining acceptable activities of the regions in 
foreign policy is a law passed by the federal government in 1999 in an attempt to provide 
clear and definitive guidance to the regions.  In reality, the law represented “a 
codification of the present situation which grants the regions considerable freedom in the 
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sphere of international policy and foreign economic policy.”156  The law did emphasize 
that the Constitution is the supreme body of law in guiding the regions’ foreign policy 
activities, and forbid the regions from acting as independent bodies in international 
law.157  However, under the new law the regions are permitted to establish contacts and 
sign agreements below the level of government provided they do not contradict 
Moscow’s policy, or they may establish contacts at the government level if approved by 
Moscow.158  While this law may finally have provided clarity to the legal framework, it 
does not mean that the framework is strictly followed by the regions, or strictly enforced 
by the center. 
3. Benefits of the Regions’ Involvement in Foreign Policy 
Fortunately, the regions’ involvement in foreign policy can at times benefit 
Russia.  While the central government may not always appreciate the regions’ 
participation in foreign affairs, the more inclusive foreign policymaking environment has 
helped to deepen democracy both in the regions and in the central government.  The 
involvement of the regions has resulted in the “articulation of regional and outward-
oriented interests, [which] regularly checks and balances the federal bureaucracy and 
destroys its monopoly in policy making.”159   Thus as a result of the increased power of 
the regions, the central government must increasingly consider the regions’ interests in 
making foreign policy decisions.  Democracy in the regions is also furthered by their 
participation in foreign policy, as it provides them with a mean to answer the needs and 
desires of their constituents. 
The central government has also been able to directly use the regions’ inclusion in 
foreign policy to its advantage.  While Russia as a whole experienced isolation from the 
West as a result of the conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo, the regions were able to 
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maintain contact with Western counterparts.160  Additionally, the regions can participate 
in diplomatic exchanges at the request of the central government, and/or to the benefit of 
the central government.  These might include situations where the government does not 
want to become directly involved, or when the regions’ bilateral relations with other 
countries can be utilized to the advantage of Russia.  Exemplifying the former, some 
regions were able to maintain necessary relations with the president of Cechnya, Alan 
Maskhadov, with the approval of Moscow, when the central government wished to 
remain behind the scene.161  Characteristic of the latter, close ties between Kaliningrad 
and Lithuania, Poland, and Germany, have helped to defuse territorial disputes.162  
Similarly, relations between Karelia and neighboring Finnish regions have been an asset 
to Russia in its relations with Finland.163  At times, regional leaders have taken the 
initiative to independently further the interests of Moscow.  One such case was when the 
governor of Saratov “distinguished himself by actively committing himself on his own 
diplomatic missions to an improvement in relations with Ukraine.164 
The preceding examples demonstrate that the regions’ involvement in foreign 
policy can indeed be utilized to Moscow’s benefit.  The central government does appear 
to be increasingly willing to include the regions in the making of foreign policy, as 
evidenced by the growing extent to which governors are serving as members of official 
delegations for diplomatic missions.165  The more that Moscow is able to incorporate the 
regional leaders into foreign policy issues, particularly when they are issues of significant 
concern to that region, the stronger, and better supported Moscow’s foreign policy will 
be.  In addition, such efforts at expanded inclusion of the regions may decrease the 
prevalence of the regions’ own independent initiatives.  However, until the central 
government can work better and more frequently with the regions, or provide better 
controls on the regions’ individual forays into foreign policy, these initiatives will remain 
a threat to cohesive foreign policy. 
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  4. Dangers of the Regions’ Involvement in Foreign Policy 
All too frequently, the regions have begun to conduct their own diplomacy, or 
paradiplomacy.166  Such initiatives carry serious consequences for Russia, as these 
regional forays often undercut Moscow’s policies.  Unfortunately, Moscow does not 
appear to have either the means or the will to crack down on the regions.  As a result of 
the seemingly freehand provided to the regions, Moscow’s foreign policy often becomes 
fragmented, and its capacity to make credible foreign commitments is hindered.167    
 Fortunately, numerous obstacles that regions face in pursuing their own 
paradiplomacy make such efforts impractical for many of the regions due to the resources 
required and risks assumed.  Many regional leaders lack the knowledge and experience to 
pursue their own foreign policy initiatives.  Even if regional officials do possess the 
requisite knowledge to conduct their own foreign policy, many of the regions lack the 
basic resources and infrastructure, such as transportation networks, banking services, 
tourist facilities, and communication infrastructure, needed in order to assume 
international standing.168  Finally, the ability of the regions to counter the central 
government’s foreign policy is hindered by their individualistic nature.  Instead of 
seeking out ways to form alliances, each region “prefers to tackle the federal government 
individually, making use of its political status, access to mineral resources or 
geographical position, and avoiding binding commitments with others.”169  Thus, it 
appears that the individualism promoted by the creation of bilateral treaties has 
permeated into other policy realms. 
Perhaps one of the most threatening ways for the regions to interfere in foreign 
policy issues is by aggravating tensions with other countries.  This has already occurred 
in Pskov Oblast, where the actions of regional officials have increased tensions between 
Russia and the Baltic states.  The region continues to exploit Estonian and Latvian claims 
to territory under its jurisdiction in order “to excite nationalist sentiments among the local 
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electorate and divert attention from social and economic problems.”170  Pskov’s actions 
have only served to push the Baltic states further towards NATO, and away from 
Moscow.  In another case, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, in posturing for a run at the 
presidency, attempted to renew Russian claims to the Crimean peninsula, which only 
served to exacerbate tensions between Russia and Ukraine.171  
The actions of both Luzhkov and Pskov’s leaders also demonstrate the tendency 
of regional leaders to pursue foreign policy with a very narrow focus.  In both cases, the 
regional leadership pursued their own self-interest.  Now that they must remain 
accountable to the electorate, foreign policy provides regional leaders with a means to 
build support for their administration.  The resultant policies often promote regional 
interests at the expense of the interests of both the country as a whole, and other 
regions.172   
In the pursuit of their own foreign policy, regional leaders frequently contradict 
the position of the federal government.  Exemplifying this, representatives from 
Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Sakha, Tatarstan, Tyva, Khakassiya, and Chuvashiya 
participated, contrary to the wishes of the federal government, in a 1997 meeting of 
Turkic states and communities which resulted in a statement, approved by the Russian 
attendees, calling for international recognition of the Turkic Republic of Northern 
Cyprus.173  The position of the Russian regions contradicted the Russian policy of not 
extending recognition to Northern Cyprus.  The actions of the regions precipitated 
concerns from the Republic of Cyprus, resulting in the need for the Russian Foreign 
Ministry to apologize for the regions’ actions and reassert the country’s official 
position.174   
While the Turkic regions’ recognition of Northern Cyprus certainly placed the 
federal government in an awkward position, the situation was easily resolved.  In other 
cases, the actions of the regional governments have taken on a more sinister tone, 
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particularly in the Far East.  In 1992, the governor of Sakhalin Oblast worked with the 
military stationed on his territory to prevent Moscow from reaching an agreement with 
Japan and returning the Kurile Islands to Japan.175  The actions of the Sakhalin governor 
had serious implications, forcing the cancellation of Yeltsin’s trip to Japan, and holding 
up efforts at reconciliation with Japan.176  In another situation that arose in the Far East, 
the governor of Primorski krai subverted Moscow’s attempts at reconciliation with both 
Japan and China, “by hyping traditional Russian xenophobia, unilaterally reversing 
federal policies that permit the visa-free entry of Chinese traders, and ordering Russian 
patrol vessels to shoot at Japanese fishing boats that violate Russia’s territorial 
waters.”177 
In these cases, the actions of the Far East leaders may have been driven by 
something more than individual self-interest.  While to some extent their actions may be 
motivated by the desire to use nationalism to build support for themselves, it is also 
possible that they were impelled by concerns of Chinese assimilation due to the growing 
numbers of Chinese living in the Far East.  This fear appears to have been the motivating 
factor for the legislature of Chita Oblast when they passed a law, contrary to federal 
policies, which restricted Chinese immigration into the border region.178  Thus, the 
preceding examples of paradiplomacy in the Far East can alternately be viewed as 
attempts by the regions to influence policy directly, due to a lack of adequate 
representation of their interests by the federal government.  This could potentially be 
rectified by providing the Federation Council with a broader role in foreign policy 
decisions.  Some leaders “hope to turn the council into the main vehicle for engaging 
foreign parliamentarians on a range of commercial and diplomatic issues.”179 
To some extent, then, the regions’ interjection into the realm of foreign policy 
may be motivated by the weakness and unresponsiveness of the federal government.  As 
such, Moscow may be able to reassert control over foreign policy by furthering their 
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attempts to more extensively integrate the regions into foreign policy decisions.  
However, the central government also needs to enforce its supremacy.  Although some 
paradiplomacy may benefit the federal government, the risks associated with allowing the 
regions to pursue their own interests abroad, regardless of their effects on Moscow, are 
too great.  
Until the foreign policy initiatives of the regions become more strictly regulated, 
the policy process in Moscow will remain complex.  Additionally, other countries are 
faced with the dilemma of deciding to what extent they should incorporate the regions 
into foreign policymaking.  While other countries may benefit from cooperation with 
regional leaders, such cooperation could also provide those countries with the ability to 
“circumvent Moscow’s internecine politics.”180  Such attempts to conduct foreign policy 
through the regions instead of the center could lead to “trans-sovereign meddling,” with 
“outside powers…trying to take advantage of the aspirations of regional leaders to further 
their own political agendas.”181  In reality, this problem has already surfaced as 
evidenced by attempts by Belarussian President Lukashenka to court Russia’s regions 
when the central government is ignoring him.182 
5. Conclusion 
Mikhail Alexseev has argued that the paradiplomacy of the regions has been 
“marginal,” because their actions have not profoundly impacted Moscow’s foreign policy 
in any way.183  His justification for this argument is that the regions have not fragmented 
Russia’s policies on NATO enlargement, the conflict in Kosovo, or other major policy 
issues, and the regional leaders had no input in the drafting of Putin’s foreign policy 
doctrine.184  Although he is correct in acknowledging the lack of regional influence in 
overall policy, that may indeed be a large part of the problem.  Regardless of the extent to 
which the regions are affecting Russia’s foreign policy, their actions cannot be 
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disregarded.  They certainly do nothing to contribute to strong, cohesive foreign policy.  
While the continued influence of the regions in foreign policy will certainly not spell the 
end of Russia, the regions will only make the obstacles to an unfragmented policy that 
much greater.  Alexseev’s argument seems to provide support for the idea that Moscow 
needs to be more receptive to input from the regions.  Doing so will not only decrease 
independent foreign policy initiatives being pursued by the regions, but also make 
Russia’s foreign policy that much stronger.  However, incorporating the regions more 
extensively into foreign policy decisions can only be accomplished through the strict 
enforcement of the current legal framework. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 The expansion of the regional tsars into the realms of the military and 
foreign policy has yet to significantly undermine the policies of the central government.  
However, the multiple examples of the regions’ interference in these matters demonstrate 
that the potential certainly exists.  Because of the benefits that Moscow has in some cases 
reaped from overlooking these abuses of power by the regional leaders, the central 
government may be tempted to allow the violations of the legal framework to continue.  
Whatever the results of the regions’ impunity, the federal government is sending the 
regions the wrong message.  The more that the regions’ intervention in these realms is 
allowed to persist, the greater the potential for Moscow’s policies to be seriously and 
irreversibly undermined. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters have shown that the tremendous freedom provided to 
regional leaders both by the lack of a strong, clear legal framework to guide Russia’s 
center-periphery relations and the lack of effective checks on their power has resulted in 
the emergence of very strong regional power centers.  While perhaps only a minority of 
regional leaders actually deserve the name regional tsar at this time, there can be no doubt 
that if the central government continues to allow regional leaders to expand their spheres 
of de facto power, more will earn the title.  Fortunately, the central government has 
identified the reassertion of power over the regions as a priority, and is seeking out ways 
to de-conflict the various legal documents guiding Russia’s center-periphery relations and 
limit the powers of regional tsars.  The federal government seems to be on the right track 
with their reforms targeting the foundations of federalism in Russia; however, the process 
is only beginning, and will not be quick or easy.  There has been, and no doubt there will 
continue to be a tremendous amount of resistance from the regions.  The future of 
federalism in Russia will certainly depend on the central government’s ability to balance 
the regional government’s concerns of centralization with their own concerns of 
separatism.   
B.   NECESSARY REFORMS 
This thesis has argued that the way in which federalism is structured in Russia, 
combined with the legal framework that evolved to guide center-periphery relations and 
the lack of mechanisms to enforce the framework, provided regional leaders with the 
ability to rule as they see fit within their regions.  In the absence of any strong reaction 
from the central government, the regions have increasingly expanded their power into 
realms intended to be under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government.  Center-
periphery relations as they exist today are unstable and threaten the security and stability 
of the country.  Lacking any action from the central government, the regions are likely to 
continue pushing the limits of their power.   
52 
The central government’s ability to rein in the regions is dependent on a variety of 
factors to include such things as their ability to deal with assertions of ethnicity, their 
ability to follow through on their financial obligations to the regional governments, the 
distribution of taxes, and many other issues.  However, perhaps most fundamentally, the 
reassertion of control over the regions will depend on the ability of the central 
government to develop a stable and equitable federal structure that is based on a clear, 
concise legal framework, with effective enforcement mechanisms.  Reforms targeting 
these issues will not resolve all of Russia’s center-periphery problems, but will certainly 
be a step in the right direction. 
President Putin, acknowledging the extent to which regions were moving outside 
of Moscow’s control, introduced several reforms in June 2000 aimed at decreasing the 
power of regional leaders.  They included:  the creation of seven super-regions, the 
restructuring of the Federation Council, and granting the President the power to remove 
governors accused of corruption.185  Some have been quick to charge Putin with 
attempting to abolish federalism in Russia.  However, a closer look at Putin’s reforms 
reveals that they may just be exactly what Russia needs.  And, while they may allow for 
some centralization of power, that is not such a bad thing considering that Russia was 
well on its way to becoming a confederation. 
Putin’s first, and perhaps most controversial reform, involved the creation of 
seven super-regions, each headed by a presidentially-appointed representative.  The tasks 
of these representatives include “oversee[ing] and monitor[ing] the regions’ compliance 
with the Russian Constitution, federal laws and presidential decrees…[as well as] be[ing] 
entrusted with the selection and placement of personnel in regional branches of federal 
government agencies…[and] look[ing] out for national security interests in the 
regions.”186  If effectively implemented, these representatives would ensure that federal 
laws were taking precedence over regional laws, thus stymieing the attempts of regional 
leaders to declare the supremacy of regional laws and ignore federal laws.  The federal 
selection of personnel for the regional branches of federal agencies would improve the 
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vertical checks on local power, by ensuring that these officials are not serving the 
interests of the regional leaders.  Previously, the governors and republic presidents had 
been able to influence the selection of personnel in many of the regional federal agencies, 
to include the prosecutor’s office, the Federal Security Service, the police, the tax 
inspectorate and tax police, courts, and customs officials, with even the strongest of these 
being “only ostensibly independent of local authorities.”187  Finally, by charging the 
presidential representatives with the task of looking out for national security interests, 
one can assume that this would include monitoring the development of independent 
military and foreign policy initiatives in the regions that could potentially undermine the 
security of the country.   
The presidential representatives have achieved mixed results since their 
implementation.  Their primary task of de-conflicting regional and federal laws has seen 
the most success, but the problem is far from being completely resolved.  For example, 
after six months of work, of the seventy-five regional laws needing to be brought in line 
with federal legislation in Tatarstan, only nine were corrected; with seventeen out of 
ninety-two corrected in Bashkortostan; and one out of twenty-six in Moscow.188  After 
one year, Putin claimed that 80 percent of the errant regional laws had been brought in 
line, but the actual benefits of this success are difficult to determine.189  Although on 
paper the regional laws may coincide with federal laws, this does not mean that actual 
behaviors have changed.  Even with the creation of a unified legal space, the dearth of 
checks on the regional leaders’ power still provides them with the means to rule 
autocratically.   
The real benefit of the super-regions may come in the long run as a potential 
alternative to the current federal structure.  It is commonly acknowledged that Russia 
would benefit from a reduction in the number of its constituent members.  Some of the 
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various propositions for restructuring the Russian federal structure will be discussed later, 
but for now it should be mentioned that the federal districts can alternately be viewed 
“not [as] another layer of bureaucracy, but a structure parallel to the regions, intended to 
eventually replace the regions.”190 
The second reform that Putin introduced in June of 2000 altered the structure of 
the Federation Council.  Previously, the Federation Council had been composed of the 
top legislative and executive official from each region.  As already mentioned, because 
the members of the Federation Council receive immunity from prosecution, the regional 
leaders did not have to fear being punished for their illegal acts.  An additional problem 
with the existing structure was that the regional leaders were too burdened with their 
work in their respective regions to be effective members of the Council.  During the few 
days each month that they were able to come to Moscow, they were more concerned with 
lobbying various ministries than dealing with the legislative workload of the Federation 
Council.191  Their membership on the Council forced local leaders to be distracted from 
the problems in their home regions, while the business of the Council suffered because 
the regional leaders were “often ill-informed about the issues, relying on guidance from 
their staff.”192   
Putin’s reform altered the composition of the Council so that each region is 
represented by two full-time members, one chosen directly by the regional executives, 
and the other selected by the regional assemblies.193  The benefits of this reform are 
threefold.  The restructuring will allow the regional leaders to focus more on the 
problems of their respective region, without having their attention diverted by business in 
Moscow.  Similarly, the Federation Council will be more effective, being filled with 
legislators who can be more efficient than their predecessors, while still representing the 
interests of their respective regional government.  Finally, much to the chagrin of the 
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regional leaders, they will lose their immunity, thus forcing them to be more accountable 
for their lawless actions.  
The third major reform introduced by President Putin in June 2000 granted him 
the power to remove governors accused of corruption.  As with the elimination of 
immunity for the governors, this reform will serve as a vertical check on the 
machinations of the regional leaders.  In the year since the reform was introduced it has 
yet to be utilized, although the threat of it may have led to the resignation of the 
obscenely corrupt governor of Primorskii krai, Nazdratenko, in February of 2001.  
Accordingly, this reform “serves as a ‘fly-swatter’ over the heads of the governors, and 
this threat is more important than its actual realization.”194 
Overall, Putin’s reforms seem to focus on strengthening the vertical checks on the 
power of the regional leaders.  While these measures may restrict the abuses of power by 
the regional leaders, they also result in some degree of centralization of the state.  As a 
result, Russia is still in need of horizontal checks on the regional executives.  The 
strengthening of the courts and regional legislatures may not be easily resolved.  
However, Putin is taking some efforts to strengthen regional courts, to improve the 
regional police forces, and to withdraw the regional legislatures from executive control.   
In order to strengthen the independent nature of regional legislatures, measures 
are being considered that would require some of the seats to be based on party lists, 
which would then allow the legislators to “take cues from the governors as well as from 
party leaders in Moscow.”195  Because the governors now face dismissal if found guilty 
of corruption, they may also be less likely to use illegal means to get themselves and 
those they support for the legislature elected.  Thus, in addition to the governor having 
less influence over the legislators once in office, he may also experience more difficulty 
in getting them into office in the first place.  The net result would be a legislative branch 
that could check the executive branch’s abuses of power.   
Putin also seems to realize the need for stronger regional courts that are not reliant 
on regional funding.  In March of 2000, Putin expressed interest in returning court 
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financing to federal jurisdiction and raising judges’ salaries.196  Although action on this 
measure has not yet been taken, should Putin carry out this reform, the governors would, 
to a great extent, lose both direct and indirect influence over the courts. 
Improving both the horizontal and vertical checks on regional leaders would 
certainly limit regionalism in Russia; however, in order to build a strong federative 
government, Russia needs to reform its very foundations.  Most importantly, this would 
involve the creation of a strong and clear legal framework to delineate the powers of the 
central and regional governments.  Putin is taking steps in this direction, as evidenced by 
a commission he set up in June 2001 that was tasked to divide up power between the 
federal, regional, and local governments.197  In particular, the commission is targeting the 
bilateral treaties that were signed from 1994 to 1999.  Although the existence of the 
treaties is guaranteed by the Constitution, it is hoped that their importance can be reduced 
so that they only cover issues not addressed in other bodies of federal law.198  The overall 
goal of the commission is to “reduce the numerous documents that now govern center-
periphery relations and replace them with a tidy set of laws….[and] to replace the treaties 
with a common set of rules for the regions and provide them with equal rights.”199 
Some regions have already demonstrated a desire to assist in strengthening the 
legal framework that guides center-periphery relations.  Evidencing this, the leaders of 
Ulyanovsk, Nizhnii Novgorod, Marii Ell, and Omsk have all renounced their bilateral 
treaties with the federal government in order “ ‘to ensure the superiority of the 
Constitution and federal law.’”200  However, these regions also had received relatively 
few benefits from their treaties compared to other regions, such as Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan, which receive significant benefits that they are unlikely to willingly give 
up.  The differentiation in benefits provided by the treaties is indicative of the problems 
that Russia’s asymmetrical framework continues to create.   
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The preceding reforms will no doubt come into effect very slowly.  In the 
meantime, efforts to restrict the de facto powers of regional leaders can also be facilitated 
by expanding their access to the federal government.  Should the federal government 
make a conscious effort to consult regional leaders on more matters, and incorporate the 
regions’ concerns in their decisions and actions, the regions would be provided with 
another avenue through which to affect policy.  Over time, regional leaders may find this 
avenue more attractive than acting outside of the boundaries of the law. 
C. RESTRUCTURING THE FEDERATION 
As previously mentioned, the commission appointed by Putin intends to ensure 
that all regions are equal; however, that may not be possible with the current structure of 
the federation.  Several proposals have been made since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
to restructure the constituent units of Russia along more practical lines.  The structure as 
it exists today was not intended by its creators to serve as a basis for true federalism.  The 
attempt by Russia to build a federation on the foundations of the Soviet structure resulted 
in an asymmetrical structure that “was a salvation for Russia in 1991-96, but now 
constitutes a destructive force for the federation.”201  As such, the creation of a stable 
federative arrangement in Russia that can provide the basis for a cohesive, clear legal 
framework will most likely require the eventual restructuring of the constituent units of 
the country.  Such an undertaking certainly would not be without its obstacles, but would 
reap many benefits in the long term.  Those working on the 1993 Constitution identified 
the unsustainability of the current federation structure when the inequality was described 
as “ ‘a minefield’ that would have to be defused sooner or later.”202 
The various proposals for restructuring Russia’s federal structure vary 
significantly, particularly in the extent to which they provide for ethno-territorial 
divisions.  Some advocate the perpetuation of the ethno-territorial structure that exists 
today, claiming that it would be too difficult to abolish the ethnic republics.  Others 
advocate the opposite extreme, proposing that Russia create a unique federal structure 
based on “the self-expression and limited self-government of communities at the local 
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(rather than the regional or national) level.”203  Most promising, though, are proposals 
advocating the creation of a strictly territorial based federal system. 
Numerous proposals have suggested that the country’s constituent units be 
entirely based on territorial divisions with nationality becoming an individual matter.  
Most of the suggestions recommend the reduction in the number of federal subjects from 
eighty-nine to anywhere from forty-five to seven.  The most well-known proposal for 
territorial federalism was put forth by Oleg Rumyantsev during the constitutional debate 
in the early 1990s.  He proposed that the territorial formations be combined into twenty 
regions structured similarly to the landers in the Federal Republic of Germany.204  
Eventually, these territorially based regions would be raised in status to equal the ethnic 
republics, and ethnicity would be phased out so that “all Russia’s provinces would 
become equal in status; and ethnicity would be disentangled from the state.”205 
Rumyantsev’s and other similar proposals that call for the creation of somewhere 
between ten and fifteen territorially based divisions, with ethnically based divisions being 
abolished, also have to address the inevitable resistance from the ethnic republics.  Most 
of the ethnic republics would probably be more likely to resent the loss of their special 
privileges than the actual elimination of the representation of their ethnic interests.  This 
is because Russia is actually quite ethnically homogenous, with Russians making up 
more than 82 percent of the population, and because in many of the ethnic republics the 
titular nationality is a minority.206  However, many opponents to a territorially based 
system argue that the ethnic republics cannot be abolished because “one cannot simply 
try to ignore (or reverse) the structures that have been in place for the last seventy 
years.”207  To the extent that concerns regarding the abolition of the ethnic republics are 
in regards to ethnic issues, any attempt to restructure Russia along strictly territorial lines 
would require the creation of effective mechanisms for dealing with ethnicity issues 
outside of federal structures.  Various advocates of a lander system have proposed 
                                                 
203 Lynn and Novikov, 6. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Teague, 31. 
206 Boris Lagutenko, “Need for Administrative-Territorial Reform Detailed,” Moscow Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 24 October 2000 [database on-line]; available from FBIS. 
207 Lynn and Novikov, 5. 
59 
alternate measures to accommodate ethnicity concerns to include:  the creation of 
Councils of National Communities at the regional and federal levels for dealing with 
issue such as non-Russian language education and the development of non-Russian 
cultures; and Sergei Shakray’s “February Thesis,” which proposed an eleven-point 
nationalities policy for dealing with ethnic concerns in alternate ways.208 
The transition to a territorially based system would not be without its obstacles 
and opponents.  However, the ethno-territorial system that exists today is too complex 
and contradictory to provide a strong base for an effective federal structure.  Instead of 
facilitating the growth of federalism in Russia, it hinders it by complicating the 
delineation of powers between the central and regional governments.  The ambiguity of 
center-periphery relations only serves to foster the growth of regional tsars.  Russia 
would benefit from the abolition of the current ethno-territorial structure, replacing it 
with a simple and clear territorially based system.  As long as the concerns of the ethnic 
minorities are accommodated through alternate channels, such a system could emerge as 
a stable foundation for federalism in Russia. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The political and security implications of regionalism in Russia that have been 
addressed in thesis should not leave the reader with the view that the devolution of power 
to Russia’s regions should not have occurred.  Rather, the transfer of powers to the 
regions should not have occurred in the manner in which it did.  By allowing the regions 
to take as much autonomy as they could swallow in the early years of the Russian 
Federation, the central government set itself up for the difficult task of wresting power 
from the regions.  Had the federal government adopted a strong cohesive legal framework 
for delineating the appropriate spheres of power for the central and regional governments 
they may have been successful in stabilizing the balance of power.  However, because the 
Federation Treaty, Constitution, and bilateral treaties were vague and contradictory and 
built off of an antiquated federal structure, the regional leaders were able to maintain and 
even expand the power grasped in the early 1990s.  As a result, many of Russia’s regions 
find themselves with authoritarian governments that have little regard for democratic 
norms.  While this trend is quite troubling in and of itself, the expansion of the regions’ 
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influence into areas of federal jurisdiction is even more so.  Although the regions’ effects 
on the military and foreign policy have not yet been more than mild irritants, they hold 
the potential to significantly undermine both the security and stability of the country.   
President Putin’s recent reforms appear to be targeting some of the key problems 
in the balance of power between the central and regional governments, to include the 
contradictory legal framework and the dearth of checks on regional power.  However, 
these reforms are only the beginning of what will no doubt be a long and painful process.  
More reforms are needed, the most essential of which is a restructuring of the federal 
structure itself.  Fortunately, though, Putin’s struggle to rein in the regions is not a fight 
to maintain the integrity of the country; instead, it is a quest to solidify the foundations of 
the Russian Federation.   
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